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THE INVISIBLE MAN: A CALL TO
EMPOWER INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS
AND BENEFICIARIES AGAINST
FIDUCIARY BREACHES IN ERISA PLANS
ANDREA KOUTOULOGENIS*

INTRODUCTION
Sam is a fifty-three year old employee' of Company X, a farm
equipment manufacturer.! Sam and the other employees in his
division were participants 3 in Company X's self-funded welfare
benefit plan' protected by the Employee Retirement Income Secu-

* J.D./LL.M. Candidate, January 1999.
1. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) does
not clearly define the term "employee" or "employer." "Employee" refers to
any individual who works for an employer. ERISA § 3(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6)
(1994). "Employer" refers to "any person acting directly as an employer" or "in
the interest of an employer" with regard to an employee benefits plan. ERISA
§ 3(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (1994). The Supreme Court recently deciphered
this circular language by declaring that the common law definition of employee is controlling. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323
(1992). The common law test for who is an employee is not simple. The test is
comprised of thirteen factors, of which, no single factor is dispositive. Id. 32324. In order to determine who is an employee, a court must examine the work
relationship as a whole. Id. at 324.
2. This hypothetical is based upon the facts in Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116
S. Ct. 1065 (1996). This situation represents only one of the many ways in
which a fiduciary breach can result in the loss of benefits to an individual
employee.

3. A "participant" is the person ERISA seeks to protect. ERISA § 3(7), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1994). "Participant" is defined as "any employee or former
employee.., who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit" from a plan,
"or whose beneficiaries may become eligible to receive any such benefit." Id.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,
489 U.S. 101, 117-18 (1989), interpreted this definition to refer to employees
in covered employment or former employees who reasonably expect to return
to covered employment or who have "a colorable claim to vested benefits." In
order to demonstrate eligibility for benefits, a claimant must have a colorable
claim in a suit for benefits, or prove that eligibility criteria will be met in the
future. Id. at 117-18.
4. ERISA neither defines the term "plan" nor illustrates how to create a
plan. ERISA §§ 3(1)-(3) indicate only that "plan" means an employee welfare
benefit plan, an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which comprises both
a welfare benefit plan and a pension benefit plan. ERISA §§ 3(1)-(3), 29
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rity Act (ERISA).' Toward the end of the 1980s, Company X developed a scheme to rid itself of some of its floundering divisions.
Sam's division happened to be one of the divisions targeted by the
Company. The scheme consisted of transferring the Company's
money-losing divisions into a newly-created and separately incorporated6 subsidiary7 that was, from its inception, effectively bankrupt8 with little chance of survival. To do this, Company X took
two steps. First, it transferred 4000 of the retirees from Company
X's self-insured health plan to the new subsidiary plan. Second,
Company X induced 1500 employees to transfer to the new subsidiary by intentionally overstating its prospects and by promising
that employees' benefits would remain secure. Sam and approximately 1500 other employees elected to move to the new subsidiary as a result of the Company's representations. Company X
knew that the failure of the newly created subsidiary would automatically eliminate Company X's obligations to pay medical and
other non-pension benefits 9 and avoid distressing the remainder of
Within two years, the subsidiary declared bankits employees.
U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(3) (1994). Welfare plans may provide, through the purchase
of insurance or other means, medical, surgical or hospital care and benefits in
the event of accidental death, dismemberment, illness or unemployment.
ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C § 1002(1). Welfare plans may also provide vacation
benefits, apprenticeship and training programs, day care services, scholarship
funds and prepaid legal aid. Id. Pension benefit plans may provide for retirement income to employees or create a system through which employees
can defer income to a retirement account over the period of covered employment. ERISA § 3(2)(A)(i)- (ii), 29 U.S.C. 1002(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (1994).
5. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,

88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)).
6. "Incorporation" refers to the process by which a corporation is formed.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 766 (6th ed. 1990). Incorporation creates a legal or

political body that can exist indefinitely unless the act of incorporation limits
the subsidiary in some way. Id.
7. A "subsidiary" is a company controlled by a "parent" corporation. Id. at
1428. The parent is able to exercise control over the subsidiary because it
owns a majority of the subsidiary's stock. Id.
8. "Bankrupt" refers to the inability of an individual, partnership, corporation or municipality to pay its debts as they are due. Id. at 147.
9. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1068 (1996). Company X employees had to elect to transfer to the new subsidiary in order for Company X's
scheme to succeed. It is not generally understood why the success of the
scheme rested upon employee consent to the transfer. The Supreme Court in
Varity argued that consensual transfer shielded Varity from the "undesirable
fallout that could have accompanied" direct termination of benefits. Id. The
lower courts believed that Varity's employee consent requirement stemmed
from "a desire to avoid a severance pay obligation" and to "shift liability for
unfunded retirement benefits." Varity Corp. v. Howe, 5 ERISA Litig. Rep. No.
2, at 12 (June 1996).
10. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1069. Company X could have avoided the situation
had they chosen to terminate employee welfare benefits directly. Id. at 1068.
ERISA generally permits employers and plan sponsors to adopt, modify or
terminate welfare plans at any time and for any reason. Adams v. Avondale
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ruptcy. Sam lost his job and his benefits ceased.
Unfortunately, thousands of employees experience similar
disruptions in employment benefits when employers, acting as fiduciaries, 1 mislead plan participants about information that it
holds as a plan sponsor, 12 especially when that information may
seriously impact a participant's benefit elections. 3 Until recently,
none of ERISA's provisions permitted plan participants and beneficiaries" to obtain individualized equitable relief in these types of
fiduciary breach cases."' The Supreme Court's decision in Varity
Indus. Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 1990). Recently, the United States
Supreme Court re-emphasized that when an employer (who is also the plan
fiduciary) decides to amend or terminate a benefit plan, it is not acting in a
fiduciary capacity. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 77-81
(1995). However, the Varity Court determined that although decisions to
amend or terminate benefit plans are not acts of plan administration or management for which a fiduciary is accountable, conveying information about the
financial integrity of the plan or the plan's future is. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at
1074.
11. ERISA defines "fiduciary" to include any person who exercises discretionary authority or control over the management or disposition of a plan's
assets. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994). A plan fiduciary
also includes anyone who provides investment advice regarding plan assets
for compensation, or has any authority to do so or has any discretionary
authority or responsibility in the administration of the plan. Id.
12. A "plan sponsor" is the entity that establishes or maintains a plan,
usually an employer or an employee organization. ERISA § 3(16)(B), 29
U.S.C. 1002(16)(B) (1994). In the case of multi-employer plans and plans established or maintained by more than one employer, the plan sponsor is the
committee, board or other group of representatives or entities that establish
or maintain the plan. Id.
13. Kathryn D. Linstromberg, Labor Department Official Discusses Plans
to Ease Effect of Court Rulings, 23 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 892

(Apr. 1, 1996).
14. The term "beneficiary" refers to a person, chosen by the participant or
appointed by the benefit plan, who may become entitled to a plan benefit.
ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1994). Under ERISA, a participant's children or other dependents are not considered beneficiaries unless they are
specifically designated as such by the participant. Keys v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 739 F. Supp. 135, 138 (W.D.N.Y.), affd without opinion, 923 F.2d 844 (2d
Cir. 1990).
15. Varity Ruling Not Total Win for Employees, Official Says, 23 Pens. &
Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 892 (Apr. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Varity Ruling].
ERISA has always permitted an individual to bring an action for fiduciary
breach on behalf of the plan. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1994).
However, for a number of years, ERISA did not appear to permit individualized redress. See generally Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134 (1985) (precluding individual participants and beneficiaries from
bringing a cause of action for extracontractual damages); Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821 (1st Cir. 1988) (denying compensatory
and punitive damages to individual beneficiary of retirement program);
Brokke v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 703 F. Supp. 215 (D. Conn. 1988) (holding that
punitive damages are not available to individual participants and beneficiar-

ies in actions under § 502). The Supreme Court in Russell held that any recovery for a violation of § 409 goes to the plan as a whole and not to an indi-
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Corp. v. Howe,"6 however, recognized an individual's right to seek
equitable relief for a fiduciary breach under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA. 7
Although Varity authorized individual redress in cases of fiduciary malfeasance under § 502(a)(3), it failed to respond to a
second more pervasive problem. 8 The Court resurrected the controversy concerning the meaning of "other appropriate equitable
relief" in § 502(a)(3), 19 but it failed to indicate whether the monetary damages awarded to the plaintiffs were "appropriate equitable relief" under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA."° The majority called these
moneys restitution, but the dissent believed they were traditional
consequential legal damages and as such, not recoverable under §
502 (a)(3)."
Prior to Varity, the issue of whether § 502(a)(3) authorizes extracontractual damages 2 appeared to have been partially put to
rest in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates.2' The Mertens Court held that
monetary damages are not available under § 502(a)(3)'s equitable
relief provision. 4 With respect to punitive damages, the Supreme
Court, in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,"
held that a cause of action for extracontractual damages under §
409(a)' 6 of ERISA could not be maintained under § 502(a)(2) be7
cause such damages were not a valid remedy under § 409(a).2 Although the Russell Court "had no occasion to determine whether
any other provision of ERISA authorized the recovery of extraconvidual beneficiary. Russell, 473 U.S. at 140. Other courts have determined
that recovery for fiduciary breaches belongs to the plan and not an individual

beneficiary. See Simmons v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 940 F.2d 614, 617
(11th Cir. 1991) (citing Russell for the proposition that "a cause of action for

an ERISA fiduciary's breach.., arises under 29 U.S.C. § 1109 rather than §
1132(a)(1)(B), and § 1109 does not permit an individual beneficiary to re-

cover. . ."); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1162 n.7 (3d Cir.
1990) (reiterating that fiduciary liability is governed by § 409 which provides
for redress to the plan only).

16. 116 S.Ct. 1065 (1996).
17. Id. at 1075-79. Section 502(a)(3) provides that a civil action may be
brought "by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the plan, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or
(ii) to enforce any provisions of this title . . . ." ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(3) (1994).
18. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1079.
19. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
20. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1079.

21. Id. at 1084.
22. Extracontractual damages award participants and beneficiaries more
than what is contemplated by the specific terms of a plan. Corcoran v. United

Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1335 (5th Cir. 1992).
23. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).

24. Id. at 263.
25. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
26. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994).
27. Russell, 473 U.S. at 144.
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tractual damages,"2 lower courts considering damages in §
502(a)(3) actions have determined that extracontractual damages
are not an appropriate form of relief and often cite to Russell for
that proposition. 9 In some instances, the failure to define what
constitutes "other appropriate equitable relief' under § 502(a)(3)
has resulted in the denial of the only meaningful relief § 502(a)(3)
could provide an individual. s
This Comment maintains that courts have mistakenly applied
the Russell rationale to § 502(a)(3) actions. In light of the Varity
decision, this Comment proffers that "other appropriate equitable
relief' in ERISA § 502(a)(3) should provide for extracontractual
damages in cases of fiduciary breach, particularly in cases of fiduciary fraud. Part I discusses some general ERISA principles, including the reason for ERISA's enactment, the role of the fiduciary
in ERISA-protected plans and the chronology of the "other appropriate equitable relief" debate leading up to the decision in Varity.
Part II examines the types of relief at issue in the § 502(a)(3) debate and the rationale for applying one type of relief over the

28. Id. at 139 n.5 (1985). The respondent in Russell expressly disclaimed
reliance on § 502(a)(3). Id. As a result, the Court did not consider § 502(a)(3).

Id.
29. See Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 636 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that §
502(a) causes of action are "explicitly equitable"); Drinkwater v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 824 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Russell for the proposition that extracontractual damages for fiduciary breaches are not authorized
by ERISA); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499,
1508 (11th Cir. 1988) (concluding that although Russell may not be dispositive
on the issue of damages under § 502(a)(3), "a textual exegisis of the Russell
opinion, combined with careful examination of the statute's structure and
legislative history, compels the conclusion that damages for emotional distress
are unavailable under Section 502(a)(3)..."); Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809,
817 (6th Cir. 1987) (indicating that Russell and Pilot Life argue against an interpretation of ERISA favoring punitive damages); Kleinhans v. Lisle Savs.
Profit Sharing Trust, 810 F.2d 618, 626 (7th Cir. 1987) (prohibiting punitive
damages based on the Russell opinion); Hancock v. Montgomery Ward Long
Term Disability Trust, 787 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1986) (casting doubt on
the availability of extracontractual damages under ERISA after the Russell
decision); Award Serv., Inc. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Union, 774 F.2d
1391, 1391 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating in dicta that "ERISA provides various express remedies for a beneficiary, but compensatory and punitive damages
against a trustee [are] not among them."); Brokke v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 703
F. Supp. 215, 222 (D. Conn. 1988) (explaining that although Russell did not
discuss the types of damages that might be recovered under § 502(a), the Russell court indicated that recovery of "extra-contractual damages by a plan
beneficiary" is prohibited).
30. See Buckley Dement, Inc. v. Travelers Plan Adm'rs., 39 F.3d 787, 789
(7th Cir. 1994) (denying recovery for medical expenses that would have been
covered had the plan administrator processed plaintiffs claim within required
time period); Slice v. Sons of Norway, 34 F.3d 630, 634-35 (8th Cir. 1994)
(rejecting recovery of pension plan benefits promised by administrator but not
provided under the plan).
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other. Part III addresses why the Varity interpretation of §
502(a)(3) damages best protects individual participants and beneficiaries, and explores the gaps left when courts refuse to provide
remedies beyond equitable relief for fiduciary breaches. Part IV
proposes that the legislature amend ERISA so as to allow the
award of extracontractual damages in individual actions for fiduciary breach brought under § 502(a)(3). In addition, this Comment
proposes that the legislature recognize punitive damage awards
when fiduciary malfeasance arises out of fraud. This will deter fiduciary mishandling of plans and provide much needed protection
to participants.
I. ERISA: AN OVERVIEW
To understand the necessity for extracontractual remedies in
§ 502(a)(3) cases, it is important to identify how § 502(a)(3) fits into
the employee benefits protection scheme. This Part briefly surveys
the organization, history and policy of ERISA. Section A addresses
the circumstances which led to ERISA's enactment and briefly describes how ERISA is organized. Section B explores the role of the
fiduciary in ERISA-protected plans. Section C examines the relationship between § 409, § 502(a)(2) and § 502(a)(3) of ERISA.
These three sections traditionally receive close scrutiny in cases
asserting the propriety of extracontractual remedies under §
502(a)(3). Finally, Section D tracks the federal courts' interpretation of § 502(a)(3) prior to the Varity decision.
A. Congress Responds to Demands for GreaterEmployee Benefit
Protections
ERISA is the body of federal law that governs employee benefit plans and protects the welfare and economic security of participants and their beneficiaries in these plans.8 ' President Gerald
Ford signed ERISA into law on Labor Day 1974,2 thereby bringing
all prior federal regulations pertaining to employee benefits into
one regulatory scheme.33 ERISA's enactment acknowledged the
insufficient protection afforded plans and their members and also
responded to the scarcity of employee information concerning the
operation of benefit plans. ' ERISA attempts to make plan sponsors and fiduciaries more responsive to participants and employees. One way it does this is by making ERISA plans legal entities

31. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994).
32. Statement on the Employee Retirement Act of 1974, 10 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1083, 1084-85 (Sept. 2, 1974).
33. Deborah A. Geier, ERISA: Punitive Damages for Breach of Fiduciary
Duty, 35 CASE W. REs. 743, 743 (1985).
34. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
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separate from employers or sponsors.3 5 A plan can file suit, have
judgments entered against it, hire employees, enter into
agree36
ments, hold property and employ attorneys to represent it.
ERISA is comprised of four titles.3 7 Title I includes declarations of policy and all the regulatory provisions applicable to
ERISA plans, including requirements pertaining to reporting, disclosure, participation, vesting, funding, fiduciary responsibilities,
administration, enforcement procedures and group health plans. 8
Title II deals exclusively with pension plans; it houses amendments to the Internal Revenue Code relating to these plans. 9 Title
III contains miscellaneous administrative provisions and addresses issues pertaining to joint pensions, profit-sharing and the
employee stock ownership plan task force.4 0 Finally, Title IV deals
with the termination of defined benefit plans lacking assets to pay
benefit obligations.4'
ERISA protects many different types of plans and excludes
coverage of some others. Title I covers plans established or maintained by employers engaged in commerce or whose industry or
activity affects commerce, including unions representing employees engaged in commerce.' But, under Title I of ERISA, federal,
state and local government employee benefit plans,' and plans established by churches or church organizations, do not generally receive coverage.' ERISA also excludes excess benefit plans.4'5 Despite these exclusions, the fiduciary's responsibilities in ERISAprotected plans are expansive. Knowledge of the statute, proper
interpretation of its provisions and compliance with the requirements are central issues in most ERISA litigation.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
those
state

ERISA § 502(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d) (1994).
Id.
ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ERISA § 4(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)(1) (1994).
ERISA § 4(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (1994). Government plans are
plans instituted and administered by the United States Government,
governments or political subdivisions thereof. MICHAEL J. CANAN,

QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS § 8.2,

at 374 (Student ed. 1996). When state law permits, state and local governments can offer certain benefits through qualified retirement plans. Id. §
22.4, at 1103. However, these plans are controlled by the Internal Revenue
Code. Id. ERISA does not apply to government plans. Id.
44. ERISA § 4(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2) (1994).
45. ERISA § 4(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(5) (1994). Excess benefit plans
furnish benefits to highly compensated employees. ERISA § 3(36), 29 U.S.C. §
1002(36) (1994). The benefits involved in these plans do not qualify for tax

deductions. Id.
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B. The Fiduciaryin ERISA-Protected Benefit Plans
While a general understanding of ERISA is important to the §
502(a)(3) extracontractual relief issue, one must further apprehend
how the fiduciary functions in ERISA plans. Congress proclaimed
that ERISA's fiduciary responsibility provisions are an integral
part of Title I's protective mechanism." A large portion of the fiduciary's duties involves the disclosure and reporting of financial
ERISA further
information to participants and beneficiaries.'
promotes the integrity of employee benefit plans by establishing
standards of conduct and responsibility for fiduciaries, and by
providing appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the
federal courts in the event of a breach.' 8 A fiduciary can be any
individual who exercises discretionary authority or control in the
management or administration of plan assets or who provides investment advice for a fee.'9 ERISA § 404 requires that a fiduciary
discharge his or her duties to a plan for the exclusive benefit of
participants and beneficiaries. 0 In the event of a breach, a fiduciary is held personally liable for any losses that his or her conduct
causes the plan.5' The fiduciary may have to disgorge any profits
made through misuse of plan assets and be subject to other remedial relief a court finds appropriate. 2 A participant, beneficiary,
the Department of Labor or a plan trustee may sue a fiduciary for
breach." However, a cause of action must be brought within six

46. Bernard Dobranski, The Arbitratoras a Fiduciary Under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: A Misguided Approach, 32 AM. U.L.
REV. 65, 67 n.7 (1982).

47. ERISA § 101(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1021(a) (1994). In order to facilitate the
safeguarding of employee benefits, ERISA requires that plan administrators
disclose and report certain matters to plan participants and beneficiaries on a
regular basis. Id. In § 101(a), ERISA mandates that the administrator of

each employee benefit plan supply all participants and beneficiaries with a
summary plan description (SPD) and annual report information. Id. A SPD
must notify participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the benefits plan. ERISA § 102(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) (1994). It
must contain "[a] summary of any material modification in the terms of the
plan" and must communicate changes in the information contained in the SPD
as required by other sections of ERISA. Id. All information required to appear on the SPD must be written in "a manner calculated to be understood by
the average plan participant." Id.
Section 103(b)(3) directs plan administrators to distribute all information, in-

cluding statements and schedules, which is necessary to summarize the latest
annual report. ERISA § 103(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(b)(3) (1994).
48. ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW 3 (Susan P. Serota & Frederick A. Brodie eds.,
BNA, 1995).
49. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994).
50. ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994).
51. Dobranski, supra note 46, at 69.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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years of an alleged violation.54 While fiduciaries generally play a
central role in employee benefit plans, they are integral to the debate regarding § 502(a)(3).
C. The PertinentStatutory Provisions
As previously discussed, a breach of fiduciary standards and
duties subjects the fiduciary to a number of penalties.55 These
penalties most often involve a discussion of three specific sections.
ERISA § 409, § 502(a)(2) and § 502(a)(3) are central to the "other
appropriate equitable relief" debate. Understanding how these
ERISA sections relate to one another and how the leading cases
interpret them is essential to consideration of the current dilemma.
Section 409 indicates that plan fiduciaries are personally liable to the plan for any losses incurred by the plan resulting from
a fiduciary breach.56 This provision permits redress only of losses
to the plan and provides remedies that make the plan whole or
otherwise cure the breach.57 Remedies available under this provision are broad. They may include both monetary and equitable
relief, in addition to removal of the breaching fiduciary.a However, § 409 only creates liability.59 "In order to enforce the right
under § 409, a plaintiff must bring suit under § 502(a)(2)." 60
Section 502(a)(2) states that any fiduciary who breaches his or
her obligations, duties or responsibilities to a plan shall be held
personally liable for any losses incurred by the plan as a result of
the breach.61 That fiduciary must disgorge profits which have been
garnered from misuse of plan assets.62 The difference between §
409 and § 502(a)(2) exists only in the entities it permits to bring an
action against the fiduciary.63 Unlike § 409 which confers standing
54. Id.

and accompanying text.
56. ERISA § 409 sets forth the following:
[A] fiduciary... who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or
duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be personally liable to
make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such
breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which
have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and
55. See supra notes 46-54

shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court

may deem appropriate ...
ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994).

57.
58.
59.
ing).
60.

Id.
Id.
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 1080 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissentId.

61. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).

62. Id.
63. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1994).

Section 502(a)(2)

permits the Secretary, a participant, a beneficiary or a fiduciary to bring a
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to sue upon the plan, § 502(a)(2) grants participants, beneficiaries,
fiduciaries and the Secretary of Labor the right to sue."
On the other hand, § 502(a)(3) is often cited in conjunction
with § 409 and § 502(a)(2), but it does not correspond to either one,
nor does it cross-reference either section in its text 5 Section
502(a)(3) allows the Secretary of Labor, participants, beneficiaries
and fiduciaries to seek equitable relief for a violation of ERISA or
the plan terms." Prior to Varity, some federal courts broadened
the holding in Russell, a case dealing with § 409 and § 502(a)(2),
and determined that participants and beneficiaries
have no right
67
to extracontractual damages under § 502(a)(3).
D. The Courts' Position on § 502(a)(3) Priorto Varity
In order to appreciate how Varity altered the "other appropriate equitable relief" scheme in § 502(a)(3), it is important to note
where the courts stood prior to this decision. In 1985, the Russell
Court addressed the question of whether extracontractual damages could be awarded to a plaintiff for a breach resulting from a
fiduciary's failure to file a timely claim." The Ninth Circuit interpreted § 409 to permit equitable or remedial relief." On review,
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the phrase "other
equitable or remedial relief" did not include extracontractual damages. Furthermore, it suggested that this interpretation might
also apply to § 502(a)(3). 7 1 In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan chastised the majority for its sweeping interpretation and indicated that the issue of "appropriate equitable relief' under §
502(a)(3) had yet to be decided. 2
A suitable interpretation of § 502(a)(3) remained elusive. In
1990, Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon resurrected the debate
when, in one part of the opinion, Justice O'Connor insinuated that
§ 502(a)(3) would sustain an extracontractual damages claim. 7"
Finally, in 1993, Mertens v. Hewitt Associates74 attempted to recivil action for "other appropriate equitable relief" under § 409. Id.
64. Id. This would seem to imply that plans have no standing to sue for
fiduciary breach.
65. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994).
66. Id.
67. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985).
68. Id. at 136.
69. Id. at 137-38.
70. Id. at 148.
71. Id. at 150-51 (Brennan, J., concurring).
72. Id.
73. 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990).
74. 508 U.S. 248 (1993). The Ninth Circuit originally addressed the avail-

ability of legal damages against a nonfiduciary for knowing participation in a
fiduciary's breach of duty. Richard Rouco, Available Remedies Under ERISA
502(a), 45 ALA. L. REV. 631, 637 (1994). The circuit court's opinion centered
on whether § 502(a)(3)(B)(i) permitted a claim against nonfiduciaries. Id. On
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solve the matter of "appropriate equitable relief' under ERISA §
502(a)(3).
in Mertens, the Supreme Court determined that
"appropriate equitable relief' under § 502(a)(3) is defined as tradi76
tional equitable
77 relief (restitution," injunctive relief, etc.), not legal damages.
Until March 1996, the Mertens decision appeared to have resolved the controversy over "other appropriate equitable relief" in
§ 502(a)(3). However, Varity revived the issue once more.7 ' In
Varity, the Supreme Court of the United States established the
right of individual participants and beneficiaries to sue benefit
plan sponsors who intentionally mislead employees about the security of their benefits. 7 The Court awarded money damages to
the individual beneficiaries, as opposed to the plan. 80 The district
court held that these employees were entitled to "appropriate equitable relief' which included reinstatement of coverage under
Varity's plan and money damages."' The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 8' The Supreme Court83
granted certiorari and affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision.
The majority called the damages awarded to the plaintiffs restitution, but the dissent believed them to be traditional consequential
legal damages and not recoverable under § 502(a)(3) as equitable.84
The debate, once more, centers on the kinds of damages § 502(a)(3)
permits. The way in which courts interpret the damage award in
Varity will determine whether a participant receives any remedy
for a fiduciary breach in future decisions.
II.

THE COURTS' DvisIoN OVER EXTRACONTRACTUAL DAMAGES IN

§ 502(a)(3)
In recent years, attempts to define what constitutes "other
appropriate equitable relief' in § 502(a)(3) of ERISA have resulted
in a plethora of decisions that treat damage awards inconsistently.
review, the Supreme Court addressed the secondary issue regarding money
damages. Id.
75. Restitution is "[a]n equitable remedy under which a person is restored
to his or her original position prior to loss or injury, or placed in the position
he or she would have been, had the breach not occurred." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 1313.
76. An injunction is an equitable remedy, usually in the form of a court order, "prohibiting someone from doing some specified act or commanding
someone to undo some wrong or injury." Id. at 784.
77. Mertens, 508 U.S. 248 at 256.
78. 116 S.Ct. 1065, 1075-76 (1996).
79. Id. at 1078.
80. Id. at 1079.
81. Id. at 1069.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1079.
84. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1081-82 nn.1-2. The majority claimed that the
monetary relief awarded Varity employees is equitable in nature. Id.
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With the Supreme Court's ruling in Varity, the question of
whether monetary damages conform to § 502(a)(3)'s equitable relief scheme is once again before the courts.85
Many courts debating the "appropriate relief" clause disagree
about the kinds of awards that constitute equitable relief under §
502(a)(3).86 Many of these same courts contest the limits to which
equitable relief can be stretched.87 Some feel that equity must
provide whatever relief is necessary to make the plaintiff whole,
while others feel that equity has well-defined boundaries that
must be strictly adhered to in order to preserve the integrity of the
equitable relief doctrine. 9 Thus, it is necessary to first examine
the three major types of relief in contention, and how they are
applied in § 502(a)(3) cases. This Part outlines the three categories of relief relevant to the § 502(a)(3) problem and briefly examines how courts applied these remedies in § 502(a)(3) cases before
Varity. In addition, the division of the courts over the propriety of
extracontractual damages as a § 502(a)(3) remedy is closely examined.
A. Major Types of Relief at Issue in § 502(a)(3) Cases
The first type of relief, equitable relief, encompassed by §
502(a)(3) is the least contentious of the three. Equitable relief is
typically available in a court of equity. Traditionally, such relief
includes injunction, mandamus and restitution. 90 Injunctions and
mandamuses are remedies, that prohibit or compel specified actions. 91 At the federal level, the courts base grants of injunctive
relie 2 on findings that the harm caused by a particular act is so

85. Id. at 1076. Varity re-ignited the flames under the "appropriate equitable relief' debate when it expressly disclaimed the applicability of Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). Id. The Varity
majority found that since the Russell plaintiff did not rely on § 502(a)(3) and

her sort of injury (wrongful denial of benefits) was already covered by §
502(a)(1), Russell did not control the outcome of the Varity case. Varity, 116

S. Ct. at 1076.
86. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 258 (1993).
87. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145-48.
88. See infra notes 130-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of those
courts favoring a broad interpretation of equitable relief under § 502(a)(3).
89. See infra notes 116-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of those
courts opposing a broad interpretation of equitable relief under § 502(a)(3).
90. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.

91. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 5 ERISA Litig. Rep. No. 2, at 20 (1996).
92. An "injunction is an extraordinary remedy" rooted in equity. Beermart,

Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 633 F. Supp. 1089, 1104 (N.D. Ind. 1986). The decision to grant injunctive relief rests within the district court's discretion. Id.
However, the court must consider certain factors such as: (1) whether it is
likely that the plaintiff will predominate on the merits; (2) whether a sufficient legal remedy exists; (3) whether harm to the plaintiff if injunction is not
granted outweighs the harm an injunction will impose upon the defendant;
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grave that typical legal remedies are insufficient to cure the
harm.93 Restitution is available when one party is enriched at the
expense of another. 94 Like injunctions, "restitution is not a matter
of right."95 Restitution is an equitable measure that courts award
to restore an injured party to the position it occupied before the
event that caused harm.' Courts award restitution in the form of
monetary relief.97 To establish a right to restitution, a party must
demonstrate: (1) "a reasonable expectation of payment;" (2) the
other party's belief that it would have to pay; or (3) that "society's
reasonable expectations of person and property would be defeated
by nonpayment."99
Prior to Varity, courts occasionally granted "other appropriate
equitable relief" in the form of equitable remedies. 99 In Mertens v.
Hewitt Associates, the Court determined that "appropriate equitable relief" under § 502(a)(3) includes relief typically available in
equity.9 0 Health Cost Controls v. Skinner1 °1 confirmed that money
damages may be available to § 502(a)(3) claimants who successfully bring an action for restitution.1 0 2 The Skinners were participants in a welfare benefit plan (the Plan) established by the Mobil
Oil Corporation. 3 When Sharon Skinner was injured in a car accident, the HMO paid for treatment of her injuries."° The Skinners later recovered from the party responsible for Sharon's inju-

and (4) whether the injunction would adversely affect the public interest. Id.
93. United States v. City of Asbury Park, 340 F. Supp. 555, 567 (D.N.J.
1972).
94. Health Cost Controls v. Skinner, 44 F.3d 535, 538 n.7 (7th Cir. 1995).
A court deciding whether to give restitutionary relief must determine that the
defendant improperly procured benefits. Harris Trust & Savs. Bank v. Provi-

dent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 57 F.3d 608, 616 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Health
Cost Controls v. Wardlow, 825 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Ky. 1993)).
95. Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d
867, 873 (1st Cir. 1995).
96. Texas Am. Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy, 44 F.3d 1557, 1569 (Fed.

Cir. 1995).
97. Skinner, 44 F.3d at 537 n.5.

98. Harris Trust, 57 F.3d at 615.

99. See generally Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996) (discussing
some of the cases that have permitted "other appropriate equitable relief' in
the form of equitable remedies).
100. 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993). A five to four majority of the Supreme Court
held that § 502(a)(3) does not authorize monetary damages against nonfiduciaries as "other appropriate equitable relief." Id. at 249, 256-57. The significance of Mertens does not lie in the direct holding of the Court, but in the discussion of damages in which the Court engages. Steuart H. Thomsen & W.
Mark Smith, The Implications of Mertens v. Hewitt Associates for Future
ERISA Litigation, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 129, 129 (1993).

101.
102.
103.
104.

44 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 537 n.5.
Id. at 536.
Id.
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ries." 5 Health Cost Controls (HCC) filed a complaint under ERISA
§ 502(a)(3) 1°6 seeking reimbursement of the benefits paid for
Sharon's treatment. 7 Because HCC failed to allege a form of relief that was equitable in nature,'0 8 the district court determined
that HCC sought relief for money damages, which it declared impermissible under § 502(a)(3). 1°9
Skinner demonstrates some courts' insistence that monetary
damages must comply with the traditional equity scheme. These
courts are much less likely to give money damages in the form of
compensation. As will be discussed later, stern adherence to this
notion is misplaced and leaves many benefit plan participants
without a sufficient remedy in cases of fiduciary breach.
Compensatory relief is the second type of remedy at issue in
the § 502(a)(3) problem. Mertens described compensatory damages
as "monetary relief for all losses sustained as a result of the alleged breach of fiduciary duty." 10 Money damages are considered
"the classic form of legal relief.""'
Punitive damages comprise the most controversial category of
extracontractual damages a court may award. Courts have
reached opposing conclusions when considering whether ERISA
permits a plaintiff to recover punitive damages for breaches of fiduciary duty. In Russell v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
Co.,"12 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed its belief that
ERISA contemplates punitive damages on a very limited basis."'
On the other hand, the court in Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp."' did not believe that ERISA provides for punitive dam105. Id.
106. ERISA § 502(a)(3) permits a civil action to be brought by a participant,
beneficiary or fiduciary. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994).
Most of the discussion prior to this case has involved actions by participants
or beneficiaries. Skinner is one of many § 502(a)(3) cases in which a fiduciary
seeks an equitable remedy to enforce the terms of an employee benefit plan.
Skinner, 44 F.3d at 536. The fiduciary does not seek a remedy for himself, but
for the plan as a whole. Id.
107. Skinner, 44 F.3d at 536.

108. Id. at 537. HCC classified the monetary relief it sought as compensatory. Id. The court was reluctant to grant monetary relief in a form inconsistent with traditional notions of equity. Id. That is why the court declared
that monetary relief could be had by HCC if it could legitimately classify the
award as restitution, a permissible form of equitable relief. Id. at 537 n.5.
109. Id. at 537. The court of appeals reversed and remanded finding that
subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate when both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court and the substantive claim for relief are based on a
federal statute. Id.
110. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255.

111. Id.
112. 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 134

(1985).
113. Id. at 492.
114. 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968 (1981).
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ages."5 The inconsistent application of these awards represents
one of the reasons why courts have difficulty interpreting the
award provisions in § 502(a)(3) cases.
B. Why CourtsAre Divided Over the Application of Compensatory
and Punitive Remedies in § 502(a)(3) Cases
The debate over the grant of damages under § 502(a)(3) centers on differing interpretations of three sources: ERISA's actual
language, legislative history and other case law. Courts that argue against the grant of compensatory and punitive damages for
fiduciary breach under § 502(a)(3) maintain that Congress intended trust law principles to guide the interpretation of ERISA."6
Since compensatory and punitive damages are not ordinarily
available in trust law actions for fiduciary breach, these courts do
not interpret ERISA to provide such relief absent express language
to the contrary in the statute."7 Consider the petitioners' approach
to equitable remedies in Mertens."8 The petitioners argued that
equity courts at common law often granted legal remedies beyond
the scope of their authority."'9 The Mertens court felt that defining
"appropriate equitable relief" as anything a court of equity could
provide in such a case, renders the modifier "equitable" ineffectual."' Moreover, permitting "equitable relief' in § 502(a)(3) so
broad a definition effectively eradicates distinctions Congress drew
between equitable and legal relief in other sections of ERISA.'' As
a result, courts that advocate a narrow reading of "appropriate
equitable relief"are more inclined to award money damages under

115. Id. at 1216. "[Plunitive damages are not presumed; they are not the

norm; and nowhere in ERISA are they mentioned. If Congress had desired to
provide for punitive damages, it could have easily so stated, as it has in other
acts." Id. The court did not provide an explanation for its decision, but relied
instead on Calhoun v. FalstaffBrewing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 357, 359 (E.D. Mo.

1979). Id.
116. See Kleinhans v. Lisle Savs. Profit Sharing Trust, 810 F.2d 618, 627
(7th Cir. 1987) (stating that Congress intended principles of trust law to apply
to interpretations of ERISA); but see Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employees
Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1463 (5th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034, 479 U.S. 1089 (1987) (arguing punitive

damages are not available under trust law in an action for trustee's fiduciary
breach).
117. Kleinhans, 810 F.2d at 627; Sommers Drug, 793 F.2d at 1463.

118. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).
119. Id. The petitioner and Solicitor General maintained that the term
"equitable relief" referred to "whatever relief a court of equity" was able to
grant in a specific case. Id. All relief for a breach of trust could be obtained
from equity courts. Id. at 257.
120. Id. at 258.
121. Id. The Court also felt that allowing "equitable relief" in § 502(a)(3) to
mean anything available for breach of trust at common law would change the
definition of the phrase as it appears in other parts of ERISA. Id.
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§ 502(a)(3) if the award can be classified as 12restitution
and does
2
not disrupt Mertens "equitable relief" scheme.
Additionally, many of these same courts maintain that ERISA
is so deliberately and carefully drafted that courts cannot add to
the specific remedies for fiduciary breach already set forth in each
civil enforcement provision. 3 For example, § 409(a) imposes liability upon fiduciaries for breach of their duties and sets out
remedies available against them."A These include personal liability for damages, restitution and "such other equitable or remedial
relief as the court may deem appropriate."
Section 502(a)(2)
permits the Secretary of Labor, plan beneficiaries, participants
and fiduciaries to bring a civil action "for appropriate relief under
§ 409. ", 26 Courts that want to limit § 502(a)(3) remedies to those
typically available in equity (injunction, mandamus and restitution) argue that Congress specifically created two independent
provisions detailing appropriate relief in distinct terms: § 502(a)(3)
permitting only remedies that are equitable in nature 7 and §
502(a)(2) allowing equitable and legal damages." 8 Because canons
of statutory construction require statutes to be interpreted as a
whole, these courts assert that the provisions aretoo well-crafted
to be altered."
122. Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017, 1022 (6th Cir. 1995). The court,
considering whether back pay and front pay constitute "appropriate equitable
relief," found that relief sought under § 502(a)(3) must have attributes justifying departure from the general rule that money damages are legal relief. Id.
at 1022-23. The plaintiff, a former employee, brought an action against her
employer and his financial planning association alleging breach of fiduciary
duty and retaliatory discharge. Id. at 1019-20. The court of appeals concluded that back and front pay was an appropriate award against the employer because it was necessary to restore the plaintiff to the position she
would have occupied had she not been illegally discharged. Id. at 1022. The
court relied on Chauffeurs Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570-71 (1990),
which also characterized back pay as restitutionary, and proclaimed that relief "incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief may be considered to be
equitable." Since restitution is a remedy typically available in equity, the
court believed it fell within § 502(a)(3)'s "appropriate equitable relief' scheme.
Schwartz, 45 F.3d at 1022-23.
As to front pay, the court found that it is granted only when reinstatement (an
equitable remedy) is not practicable. Id. at 1023. As such, it is an equitable
remedy encompassed by § 502(a)(3). Id. See also Shore v. Federal Express
Corp., 42 F.3d 373, 378 (6th Cir. 1994) (characterizing front pay as an equitable remedy under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(g)).
123. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 251.
124. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
125. Id.
126. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
127. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
128. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
129. Northwest Paper Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 344 F.2d 47, 50 (8th
Cir. 1965).
These courts fail to recognize Congress' intention that
"courts... develop a federal common law of rights and obligations under
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At the other end of the spectrum, courts favoring a broader
interpretation of § 502(a)(3) have fashioned ERISA remedies not
specifically enumerated in § 502(a) so as to better protect ERISA
plan participants and beneficiaries.'30 In considering whether extracontractual and punitive damages are available to participants
and beneficiaries in § 502(a)(3), Justice Brennan, in his wellknown concurrence in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Russell, declared that ERISA legislative history encourages courts
to develop a federal common law."' Although courts recognize that
"ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employment benefit
plans,""" they maintain that Congress could not have intended to
deprive participants and beneficiaries of the protections afforded
by the common law and not replace them with equivalent statutory protections."' This would defeat the purpose of enacting
"legislation to protect the very persons whose rights were the focus
of the legislation.""
Justice Brennan further argued that Congress intended to incorporate trust law principles into ERISA's civil enforcement

ERISA-regulated plans." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101,
110 (1989) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)).
Hence, federal courts are authorized to supplement federal law with state law
theory when federal legislation is incomplete. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156 (1985).
130. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McLendon, 498 U.S. 133, 136 (1990)
(stating that a court may award extracontractual remedies, even punitive
damages, if the facts of a particular case require such a remedy); Haywood v.
Russell Corp., 584 So. 2d 1291, 1297 (Ala. 1991) (maintaining that the legislative history and ensuing revisions of ERISA uphold the view that Congress
intended for the courts to develop a federal common law applicable to employee benefit plans, including the development of appropriate remedies not
specifically provided for in § 502(a)). But see Pilot Life Ins., Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 41 (1987) (deciding ERISA preempts state laws that permit extracontractual and punitive damages).
131. 473 U.S. at 155-56 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Firestone Tire,
489 U.S. at 110 (upholding the development of a federal common law for
benefit plans); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1988)
(finding that a central purpose of federal common lawmaking is to correct discontinuity in statutory schemes); Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees
Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 966 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that filling gaps with respect
to ERISA benefit plans is essential and contemplated by Congress).
132. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
133. Haywood, 584 So. 2d at 1298. See also Lorenzen v. Employees Retirement Plan of the S & H Group, Inc., 896 F.2d 228, 230 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
in dicta that if "ERISA preempts suits under state tort law against employerfiduciaries by ERISA plan participants... [this] strongly implies that such
suits can be brought under ERISA; for otherwise there would be a big gap in
liability for misconduct by ERISA fiduciaries").
134. Haywood, 584 So. 2d at 1298. The court maintains that it is not unusual for statutory enactments to mimic characteristics of state remedies the
acts preempted. Id.
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scheme.1 35 Trust law principles identify equitable relief as including damages necessary to make the plaintiff whole. 136 In trust law,
courts may award both direct and consequential damages to make
a party whole.'37 Therefore, courts that favor a broader interpretation of ERISA's civil enforcement scheme argue, as Justice
Brennan did, that money damages may also be available in §
502(a)(3) for a fiduciary breach."
Moreover, not all courts feel that ERISA is consistently wellcrafted and fine-tuned. 39 While Congress closely scrutinized questions that might arise under ERISA, some courts feel it inadvertently omitted a number of issues.40 In Winstead v. J.C. Penney
Co., Inc., the court declared that there are "loads of gaps and redundancies in the law."' Those omissions or inconsistencies that
135. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156-57 (1985)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
136. H.R. 533, 93d Cong., (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4639; S.REP. 127, 93d Cong., (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 4838. Accord Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110-11. In addition, section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts permits a plaintiff alleging breach of trust to pursue a remedy that will either put the plaintiff in
the position he occupied prior to the breach or put him in the position he
would have occupied had the trustee not committed the breach of trust.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 & cmt. a (1992).
137. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1336 (5th Cir.
1992). The legislative history pertaining to § 502(a)(3) does not definitively
reveal what kinds of remedies Congress intended § 502(a)(3) to encompass.
Eduard A. Lopez, Equitable Remedies for Breach of FiduciaryDuty Under
ERISA After Varity Corp. v. Howe, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 323, 345
(1997). One author suggests that "Congress's reliance on trust law in establishing ERISA's fiduciary duties and its decision to limit relief to equitable relief..., is at least consistent with the notion that such remedies consist of
those available at common law for breach of trust." Id. at 346. See also G.
BOGERT & BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 862, at 27-29 (rev.
2d ed. 1982) (indicating that under certain circumstances, equitable relief may
include monetary damages).
138. Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1335-36.
139. Winstead v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 933 F.2d 576, 579-80 (7th Cir. 1991).
140. Id. at 579. Judge Posner summarized the problem underlying detailed
statutes like ERISA as follows:
Detailed statutes such as ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code bristle with
interpretive conundra. A statute may be detailed not because the
draftsmen quixotically undertook to resolve all possible interpretive
questions before they arose but because a number of specific problems
were brought to their attention and they tried to solve them. There
may have been an equal number of problems that were not raised and
therefore-because Congress is too busy to resolve problems that are
entirely hypothetical-not provided for. It is perverse on the one hand
to penalize draftsmen for having made detailed provision for the problems that were brought to their attention by denying them a helping
judicial hand in the problem areas they did not foresee, and on the other
hand to treat a lazily drafted statute, worded in generalities, as a broad
delegation to the judiciary to create a sensible code of governance.
Id. at 579-80.
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do not appear deliberate must be made to accord with the statute's
intent and design.'
III. VARITY RATIONALE BETTER PROTECTS PARTICIPANTS AND
BENEFICIARIES
There is little doubt that ERISA fiduciaries must act in the interest of the plans they serve and that they are accountable to
those plans for their breaches." However, emphasis on the relationship between the fiduciary and the plan undermines the fact
that participants are the intended beneficiaries of this relationship.'" Restrictive interpretations of § 502(a)(3) do not adequately
protect individual participants and beneficiaries from fiduciary
breaches. In 1988, the Education and Labor Committee of the
House of Representatives addressed violations of ERISA's fiduciary obligations that affect individuals, but not the plan." The
committee received complaints from members of Congress and
their constituents regarding improper denials of medical claims
and continuation coverage and unreasonable delays in processing
claims by employers or insurers.!" Allowing an injured participant
or beneficiary recourse through the courts in these situations is essential to fulfilling the purpose of ERISA. " 7 Varity's approach to
extracontractual damages is an effective means of protecting individual participants and beneficiaries from fiduciary misconduct.
Accordingly, Section A explores the gaps left when courts refuse to
provide remedies beyond typical equitable relief under § 502(a)(3).
Section B discusses those cases which successfully granted extracontractual relief under § 502(a)(3). Finally, Section C probes
the construction of the Varity rationale and discusses the necessity
of applying it to cases of fiduciary breach affecting individual participants.

141. Id. at 580.
142. Id.
143. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central
Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570-71 (1985).
144. The purpose of ERISA is to promote the best interests of participants
and beneficiaries through rigorous fiduciary standards of care. Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 158 (1985) (Brennan, J., concur-

ring).
145. H.R. 801, 100th Cong., p.2, at 63 (1988).
146. Id. The committee expressed concern that participants and beneficiaries were being denied the only legal recourse available to them, that is, punitive or other extracontractual remedies. Id.
147. Justice Brennan stated the fundamental purpose of ERISA is the
'enforcement of strict fiduciary standards of care in the administration of all
aspects of pension plans and promotion of the best interests of participants
and beneficiaries." Russell, 473 U.S. at 158 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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A. Shortcomings of Narrowly Interpreting§ 502(a)(3)
There are a number of situations where a narrow interpretation of § 502(a)(3) deprives individual employees or beneficiaries of
the only meaningful redress available to them under ERISA. Although ERISA fiduciaries are expected to treat administrative
conflicts impartially '8 and determine which course best serves the
interests of the plan, breaches often do occur.'" The individual
participants have little recourse under the pre-Varity scheme to
address a fiduciary breach if harm befalls them and not the plan. 50
The case of Rollo v. Maxicare of Louisiana,Inc. is a prime example
of this.' The court denied the plaintiff relief under § 502(a)(3) because he sought extracontractual remedies for tortious interference with his benefit plan
rights, specifically his right to receive
15 2
continuing medical care.

The court denied a motion to amend the complaint to include
a § 502(a)(3) claim relying, in part, on Russell. 5' However, the
Rollo court, in rendering this decision, readily acknowledged that
Russell alone could not control § 502(a)(3) issues because the case
only addressed extracontractual damages in § 409."' That is why
the court also cited Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux55 for the
proposition that Congress, in later cases, expressly proclaimed the
148. ERISA § 404(a)(1) requires fiduciaries to perform their duties for the
exclusive benefit of plan participants and beneficiaries. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994).
149. See Morse v. Stanley, 732 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that a
trustee must deal "even-handedly" with beneficiaries and safeguard the interests of the trust as a whole); Winpisinger v. Aurora Corp. of Ill., 456 F. Supp
559, 566 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (re-emphasizing a trustee's obligation to discharge
duties in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries).
150. "Pre-Varity" is used in this Comment to refer to the line of decisions
beginning with and following Russell, 473 U.S. 134. Remember that Russell
confronted the issue of whether a participant filing suit under ERISA §
502(a)(2) could recover compensatory or punitive damages under § 409, in
addition to disability benefits provided under the terms of the employee benefit plan. Id. at 136. That Court held that such damages were not recoverable.
Russell, 473 U.S. at 148. Despite the fact that the holding in Russell was
limited to actions under § 502(a)(2) and the corresponding provision in § 409,
this Comment argues that the same rationale has been misapplied in §
502(a)(3) cases.
151. 698 F. Supp. 111 (E.D. La. 1988).
152. Id. at 116. The plaintiff had been injured in an automobile accident
while a member of his employer's health care plan. Id. at 112. The defendant,
a health maintenance organization, administered the plan. Id. The defendant
then contracted with an independent physicians association for medical services to plan members. Id. The case was dismissed after the court determined
that it had subject matter jurisdiction under ERISA, but all of the plaintiffs
claims were founded on state law claims. Id. The court dismissed the suit
because none of the claims had been made under ERISA. Id. at 112.
153. Id. at 115.
154. Id.
155. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
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unavailability of extracontractual damages under § 502(a)(3). 156 In
light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Varity, this
argument is stale. A plan participant or beneficiary is now permitted to pursue individual claims under § 502(a)(3) and the decision
provides
greater latitude in the types of relief that courts can
57
award. 1
A restrictive interpretation of § 502(a)(3) led to the denial of
extracontractual damages for a flagrant fiduciary breach in Sokol
v. Bernstein.5 ' The beneficiary, Bernice Sokol, was denied relief
for medical expenses and damages for emotional distress when the
administrator of her deceased husband's pension plan fund arbitrarily disbursed death benefits without her permission."9 The
administrator refused to re-deposit the proceeds in the fund unless
Sokol waived all fiduciary breach claims against him and paid
administrative fees.'6 ' Even though the court of appeals agreed
that the defendant's conduct violated fiduciary standards mandated by ERISA, it refused to grant an award of extracontractual
16
damages. 6 ' The court argued that Russell was not dispositive.
However, an examination of the text of § 502(a)(3), combined with
close scrutiny of the entire statute and the legislative history
"compels the conclusion that damages for emotional distress are
unavailable under § 502(a)(3) as well as § 409."163
B. Courts FavoringExtracontractualDamages in § 502(a)(3)
Cases
The decision in Varity is not without precedent. A number of

156. Rollo, 698 F. Supp. at 115. In Pilot Life, the Court denied the plaintiffs
common law breach of contract and tort claims because it believed Congress
only authorized relief to individuals in the form of "accrued benefits due, [a]
declaratory judgment on entitlement to benefits, or an injunction against a
plan administrator's improper refusal to pay benefits." Id. A participant can

bring an action against a fiduciary, but only to seek the fiduciary's removal on
behalf of the entire plan. Id.
157. Stephen T. Lindo & Elizabeth S. Stong, U.S. Supreme Court Permits
Individual Equitable Recovery for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under ERISA
Section 502(a)(3), 23 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 1453 (June 3, 1996).
Prior to Varity, interpretations of ERISA have restricted individual claims by

invoking doctrines of preemption of state law remedies and clinging to narrow
limits on extracontractual and punitive damages. Id.

158. Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 1986).
159. Id. at 533, 538. The administrator violated an express contract requirement which stipulated that pension fund proceeds were to be distributed
only upon Sokol's request. Id. at 533. Disbursement of the pension proceeds
created adverse tax consequences that Sokol originally set out to avoid. Id. at
534.
160. Id. at 534.
161. Id. at 534-38.
162. Id. at 534.
163. Id.
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prior cases refused to discount the availability of extracontractual
damages in individual cases for fiduciary breach. For example, in
1987, Bartucca v. Katy Industries, Inc.'" held that an action to
collect extracontractual damages under § 502(a)(3) should not be
dismissed only because those damages were sought.'
The court
determined that the decision precluding extracontractual damages
under § 409 in Russell did not necessarily apply to recovery of
those damages under § 502(a)(1) or § 502(a)(3).16 Furthemore, it
recognized that the Supreme Court in Russell only considered extracontractual damages with respect to § 409.167 Finally, the court
noted that Justice Brennan and three other Justices reasoned that
the remaining statutory provisions and legislative history sustained a reading that provided the same protections against fiduciary breaches to plan participants and beneficiaries as it did to
the plan."
In 1993, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit declared that an individual beneficiary may file an action on his or
her own behalf for a fiduciary breach against ERISA trustees and
administrators. 169 The case involved an employee of a truck driver
service, Vaughn Bixler.' 70 Bixler and his family received medical,
disability and life insurance through the Central Pennsylvania
Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund (the Fund)."17 Bixler suffered
from a heart attack and died while his employer and the union
were negotiating the terms of a new collective bargaining agree-

164. 668 F. Supp. 111 (D. Conn. 1987).
165. Id. at 112-13. Plaintiffs, a group of terminated employees, brought suit
under § 502(a)(3) alleging that they were denied termination benefits when
Wallace, a subsidiary of the defendant, was sold to Syratech Corporation. Id.
at 111-12. The employees belonged to a welfare benefit plan that provided
termination pay for any salaried employee terminated as a result of a reduc-

tion in business activity or consolidation of operations. Id. at 111. Specifically, the terminated employees claimed that the employer, acting as plan
administrator, breached its fiduciary obligations in failing to manage and
administer the Plan in accordance with ERISA and by denying benefits due
upon termination of the plan. Id. at 112.
166. Id. at 112. One year later, the same court reiterated its conclusions regarding extracontractual damages in Brokke v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 703 F.
Supp. 215 (D. Conn. 1988). While considering and rejecting the availability of
punitive damages under ERISA, the court indicated that compensatory damages are included within the parameters of § 502. Id. at 223.
167. Brokke, 703 F. Supp. at 222.
168. Id. Justice Brennan and the three other Justices did agree that § 409
was correctly interpreted to extend benefits solely to the plan. Id. They
doubted, however, that this conclusion could be transferred so easily to §
502(a)(1) and § 502(a)(3). Id.
169. Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292,
1299-1300 (3d Cir. 1993).
170. Id. at 1294.
171. Id. The Fund was the product of a collective bargaining agreement between Mr. Bixler's employer and his union. Id.
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ment. 17' Lucinda Bixler, as administratrix of Vaughn Bixler's estate, brought suit to recover her husband's medical expenses and
death benefits.'73 Due to certain complications in the negotiation
process,"" Lucinda claimed that both the employer and the Fund
wrongfully denied her husband medical coverage.'75 She asserted
that the Fund breached its fiduciary duty when it caused her to
believe that continuing medical coverage was open only to the entire group, not the individual, under the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA). 76 In addition, Lucinda contended that the employer breached its fiduciary duty77 to properly
inform her about all options available under COBRA.
The circuit court, relying on Brennan's concurrence in Russell, held that "[slection 502(a)(3) authorizes the award of
'appropriate equitable relief directly to a participant or beneficiary
to 'redress' 'any act or practice which violates any provision of this
title."' 78 The court indicated that a generic emphasis had been
placed on the relationship between the trustee and the plan. 79 The
simple fact is that the intended beneficiary of the trustee-plan relationship is the participant. 8 ' It makes little sense to safeguard
the integrity of a plan solely for the sake of that plan. ERISA must
take into account those situations where a fiduciary breach harms
172. Id. The current collective bargaining agreement expired on August 31,
1990. Id. A few months prior to this date, the Fund informed Mr. Bixler's
employer that it was going to increase the monthly employer contribution
upon expiration of the current agreement. Id. The union wanted to continue
benefits through the Fund at the greater cost. Id. Mr. Bixler's employer re-

fused to do so. Id.
173. Id. at 1296.
174. The union and the employer were unable to reach an agreement by the
August deadline. Id. at 1294. The employer agreed to extend coverage until
September 15, but after that date it told employees it was no longer required
to make contributions to the Fund. Id. Negotiations continued after the September 15 deadline, but eventually broke down. Id. at 1295. The employer
began its plans to implement a new benefits plan and the union went on
strike. Id.
175. Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1298.
176. Id. at 1296 & n.4. In certain circumstances, COBRA, 29 U.S.C. §§
1161-68 (1994), permits individual employees to continue health and welfare
coverage on a self-pay basis. Id. at 1295. In the current case, two COBRA
notices were issued: one by the Fund when the employer ceased contributing
to the plan at the increased rate, and the second, by the employer when the
union went on strike. Id.
177. Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1295.
178. Id. at 1298.
179. Id.
180. Id. ERISA was enacted primarily to protect the "continued well-being
and security of millions of employees and their dependents ...directly affected by these plans." ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994). It is the declared policy of ERISA to protect the interests of participants and beneficiar-

ies in employee benefit plans and private pension plans. ERISA §§ 2(b)-(c), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001(b)-(c) (1994).
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an individual and not the plan. 8'
Perhaps the most persuasive decision of all came out of the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1990.182 The plaintiff, Dr. Warren, participated in a pension plan and a profit sharing plan and
trust.' 3 The Society National Bank (the Bank) administered both
plans. 8' Dr. Warren directed the Bank to transfer all of his assets
to an investment banking firm."' The Bank failed to transfer the
balance in the two plan accounts within one calendar year, causing
whatever balance remained in the account after 1984 to become
taxable."'8 Dr. Warren sued the Bank alleging that the failure to
transfer the proceeds in the two retirement accounts constituted a
fiduciary breach."7
Relying on Russell, the Bank argued that Dr. Warren sought
extracontractual damages and ERISA only provides for damages
strictly contemplated by the terms of the plan.'" Dr. Warren argued that he was entitled to compensatory damages for the Bank's
failure to follow his instructions under the plans' options for handling a participant's share of plan assets."'
The court held that a plan participant can sue for "other appropriate relief" in a case of fiduciary breach, and in its attempt to
"secure complete justice," a court of equity may award monetary
damages."' In addition, the Warren court determined that the
"other appropriate equitable relief' clause implicated a wide spectrum of remedies."' When Congress employs broad and general

181. Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1298.

182. Warren v. Society Nat'l Bank, 905 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1990).
183. Id. at 976.
184. Id.
185. Id.

186. Id. The Warrens were forced to pay over $87,000 in income taxes out of
their retirement funds. Id. In addition, the funds transferred in 1985 could
not be rolled over or kept in the IRA. Id.
187. Id. In an amended complaint, Dr. Warren contended that the Bank
negligently, or in order to earn additional fees, delayed a portion of the rollover until the next calendar year. Id.
188. Warren, 905 F.2d at 976-77. The Bank maintained that it had transferred all of Dr. Warren's assets as he instructed, and that his complaint pursued benefits that were not available under either retirement plan. Id.
189. Id. at 977. In other words, Dr. Warren "sought compensatory damages
that flowed directly and proximately from the bank's failure to provide a contractual benefit, i.e., a single lump-sum distribution." Id.
190. Id. at 982. The Court here cited Justice Brennan's concurrence in Russell, agreeing with his interpretation of the law of trusts. Id. A beneficiary is
entitled to whatever relief is necessary to put him in the position he would
have occupied had it not been for the trustee's breach. Id. This may include
monetary damages. Id. From a historical perspective, equity courts were designed "to do complete justice," and many courts have found that they may
adjust their remedies in order to grant the necessary relief. Id.
191. Id. It is important to note that this view of equitable damages accounts
for instances when "traditional" remedies in equity, an injunction or declara-
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language in a remedial statute, and if the language of the statute
is not contradicted by conclusive legislative history,' a court should
interpret the provision charitably in order to give effect to those
important congressional objectives. 9 2 Since one of the most important aims of ERISA is to protect the interests of participants and
beneficiaries, § 502(a)(3) should be given an interpretation, that
guarantees full relief when a fiduciary breach occurs.193
C. The Varity Rationale at Work
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Russell suggests that the legislative history of
ERISA encourages development of a federal common law in fashioning "other appropriate equitable relief."19 Brennan encouraged
courts faced with extracontractual damage claims to determine
whether and to what extent trust and pension laws supply a recovery beyond benefits denied by the breach.9 ' Brennan indicated
that "any deficiency in trust law in the availability of make-whole
remedies should not deter courts from authorizing such remedies
under § 502(a)(3).""' Second, Brennan instructed courts to contemplate whether extracontractual awards would antagonize
ERISA's relief provisions, while remembering that ERISA set
out
197
to promote the best interests of participants and fiduciaries.
The Supreme Court in Varity Corp. v. Howe 9 " followed this
advice. After deciding two other issues,' 99 Justice Breyer adtion of rights, would provide no redress to a participant or beneficiary. Some-

times the only redress that can cure a breach is money damages. For instance, an injunction or declaration of rights in Dr. Warren's case would not
have provided any relief at all. Id.

192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 155-56
(1985).

195. Id. at 156-57.
Benefits claims are generally brought under §
502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA. See ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B)
(1994) (providing that "[a] civil action may be brought by a participant or
beneficiary to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan...").
196. Russell, 473 U.S. at 157-58 n.17. Brennan reiterated his belief that
remedies under § 502(a)(3) were intended by Congress to strengthen the requirements of common law trusts as they apply to employee benefit plans. Id.
197. Id. at 157-58.
198. 116 S.Ct. 1065 (1996).
199. Varity raised three issues: (1) was the company acting as a fiduciary or

an employer when it spoke to employees about benefits with the new subsidiary; (2) if the company did act in a fiduciary capacity, did it breach its duty
under ERISA § 404 to act solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries; and (3) does § 502(a)(3) afford individuals relief for fiduciary breaches. Id.
at 1071, 1074-75. As to the first issue, the Court found that although ERISA
does not expressly require a plan administrator to give employees information

about future benefits to aid them in plan participation decisions, any communication that does occur falls within the ambit of fiduciary responsibilities. Id.
at 1073. The majority also rejected Varity's argument that conveying infor-
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dressed the topic of whether § 502(a)(3) authorizes monetary relief
for a breach of fiduciary duty. 2°° Breyer argued that § 502(a)(3) encompasses monetary relief for breach of fiduciary duty. °' In support of this proposition, the Court proffered two theories. First,
the language of § 502(a)(3) permits "appropriate equitable relief" to
remedy violations of Title I - the location of the fiduciary duty
provisions.2 °2 Second, § 502(a)(3) does not contain any language
that prohibits individualized damages for fiduciary breach. 20 3 The
Court felt that it was improbable that Congress would define a
breach of fiduciary duty and then not supply a remedy to individual participants and beneficiaries.2 The Court then said that the
phrase "other appropriate equitable relief" is broad enough to
mation to employees about the integrity of future benefits cannot be a fiduciary act because an employer's decision to terminate a plan is not a fiduciary
act. Id. at 1074.
Varity also argued that misleading statements about the subsidiary's

financial future had nothing to do with benefits administration and, therefore,
it could only have been speaking as an employer. Id. But, the Supreme Court
adhered to the district court's conclusion that the statements regarding the
future of the subsidiary were too closely connected to statements about benefits to be anything but a fiduciary act. Id. The essential message to employees was that transferring to the new subsidiary would not undermine the security of their benefits. Id. The Court said that "reasonable employees" in
these circumstances, could have believed that Varity was speaking to them as
both employer and plan administrator. Id. at 1073.
With regard to whether Varity actually breached its fiduciary obligations, the second issue, the Court determined that knowingly deceiving participants in order to save money at the participants' expense violates the exclusive benefit rule. Id. at 1074. "[L]ying," said the Court, "is inconsistent
with the duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries and codified in section
404(a)(1) of ERISA." Id. at 1074 (quoting Peoria Union Stockyards Co. v.
Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983)).
200. Id. at 1075-80. The Court first disposed of the contention that Russell
explicitly or implicitly answered the question of whether the "other appropriate equitable relief" clause in § 502(a)(3) includes individual relief or refers
only to relief for the plan as a whole. Id. at 1076-78. It said that the language
which limits relief to the plan as a whole appears only in § 409, and Russell
only discussed § 502(a)(2), which cross-references § 409. Id. at 1076. Russell
did not discuss § 502(a)(3). Id.
201. Id.

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1078. At oral arguments in November 1995, Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and Souter commented on the lack of remedies available to participants who have been
fraudulently misled if § 502(a)(3) did not authorize individual recovery for
breach of fiduciary duty. Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Do Plan Participants
Have a Remedy?; Justices Tackle Case Involving.Employer Accused of Misrepresentations, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 18, 1996, at 9. Justice Souter,
unconvinced that participants in the Varity plan could have sued under §
502(a)(1) for back benefits, argued that participants were left without a rem-

edy. Id. "There is no remedy. There is in fact a gap in the possibility of recovery... the individuals have nothing they can recover for." Id.
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cover individual relief for breach of fiduciary duty. 2 5 Thus, § 409 is
not the only way to remedy a fiduciary breach. 2 6 The majority rejected the notion that because § 409 specifically refers to breach of
fiduciary duty, the "catchall" provision in § 502(a)(3) cannot be interpreted to apply to a fiduciary breach.2 °7 The Court believed that
§ 502(a)(3) acts as "a safety net offering appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that § 502 does not elsewhere
Given that ERISA requires fiduciaries to
adequately remedy."'
execute their duties in the best interest of participants and beneto fathom a less comprehensive interpretaficiaries, it is difficult
2
tion of § 502(a)(3). 0
Each employer has the right to establish or not establish an
employee benefit program. 20 However, once that employer does so
and employees come to rely on the plan for welfare or pension
benefits, the employer, as fiduciary, must act in the best interest of
When a fiduciary's actions threaten or destroy
plan participants.
205. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1076. In addition, the Court noted that the basic
purpose of ERISA compels an interpretation that provides participants with a
legal remedy under § 502(a)(3). Id. at 1078. ERISA sets out to protect participants and beneficiaries through the establishment of conduct standards,
duties and obligations for fiduciaries. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)
(1994).
206. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1075-80.
207. Id. at 1076-77. The Court reasoned that four of the six subsections in §
502 deal with specific areas. Id. at 1077. For example, the first subsection
deals with wrongful denial of benefits and clarification of rights under the
terms of a plan. Id. The second addresses fiduciary obligations with respect
to the financial management of the plan. Id. The fourth deal with tax registration, and the sixth with civil penalties. Id. The language in the third and
fifth subsections creates "catchalls" which provide equitable relief for "any"
violation of'the statute. Id. at 1077-78. The Court relied on this structural
arrangement to suggest that these last two provisions are intended to relieve
those fiduciary breaches which are not provided for specifically in the other

parts of § 502(a). Id.
208. Id. at 1078.
209. John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Review of Supreme Court Decisions, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 2, 1996, at 3.
210. See McGann v. H&H Music., 946 F.2d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 1991)
(explaining that the decision to establish a plan is within the employer's discretion); Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1328 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that, "an
employer is free to develop an employee benefit plan as it wishes because the
creation of a benefit plan is a corporate management decision unrestricted by
ERISA's fiduciary duties"). There are many reasons why employers establish
and maintain employee benefit plans. Some of these reasons include the retention of qualified employees, the maintenance of a competitive position
within an industry, tax savings for the employer and tax deferral for the employee, protection against "unexpected financial loss owing to illness or injury"
and the provision of retirement income. JEFFREY D. MAMORSKY, EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS HANDBOOK, § 1.02 at 1-2 through 1-3 (rev. ed. 1995).
211. Varity Ruling, supra note 15, at 892. The solicitor general filed an
amicus brief in Varity arguing that § 502(a)(3) provides a cause of action for
individual recovery by plan participants and beneficiaries. Id. He stated that
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expectations created by a plan, the fiduciary is made accountable
not only to the plan itself, but to the individual members of the
plan it harms. It is illogical to suggest that ERISA cannot provide
redress to individuals for injuries resulting from these breaches.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENT OF § 502(a)(3)
When an individual participant lacks the ability to bring suit
against a fiduciary whose actions have cost that participant valuable benefits or coverage, ERISA fails in its efforts to better protect
the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries and maintain
the security of the plan. An individual participant or beneficiary
must be empowered to bring suit on his or her own behalf, not only
as a representative of the plan. Moreover, ERISA must be construed to provide an appropriate range of remedies - equitable and
legal - if t is to properly address the pre-Varity remedial void and
post-Varity confusion over the scope of § 502(a)(3) relief.
There are a number of ways this can be accomplished. First,
Congress must amend ERISA § 502(a)(3) to clarify and codify the
holding in Varity Corp. v. Howe. In the event of a fiduciary breach,
the amendment should explicitly provide for the grant of an award
that will return the participant to the position he or she occupied
prior to the breach, even if this requires an extracontractual remedy. Where fiduciary fraud can be attributed to the breach, §
502(a)(3) should be amended to permit punitive damages.
Second, Congress should codify a standard of review for actions under § 502(a)(3). A suit for benefits under this section
should not be viewed as an appeal from a fiduciary's adverse determination, but as an original proceeding entitled to de novo review.212 A lesser standard may appear to condone fiduciary malfeasance which costs participants precious benefits and to neglect
conflicts of interest that might lead plan administrators to deny
claims improperly.
CONCLUSION

Since the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Massachusetts
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, most plan participants covered by ERISA have only prevailed in suits on behalf of the plan;
they could not recover individually.213 In 1993, Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates held that a plaintiff who sues for breach of fiduciary
"[i]f there's a theme to the legal positions that we're taking, ERISA is notcontrary to what some advocates are saying-and shouldn't be, some magic

wand employers can wave to avoid accountability ...[i]f employers tell employees they have a benefit, they ought to be held to it." Id.
212. On de novo review, a court hears the matter anew; as a court of original
and not appellate jurisdiction. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 721

(citing Collier & Wallis v. Astor, 70 P.2d 171, 173 (Cal. 1937)).
213. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
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duty could not recover extracontractual damages under ERISA §
502(a)(3). 214 It left unresolved, however, the issue of whether a
plaintiff could obtain equitable relief for a breach of fiduciary duty
under § 502(a)(3). 15 Then, the Sixth and District of Columbia Circuits recognized a right to individual recovery in Warren v. Society
National Bank1 16 and Eddy v. Colonial Life Insurance Co.,217 respectively. The Supreme Court of the United States finally picked
up on this trend in Varity Corp. v. Howe. 18 Varity "gave new teeth
to the Federal law" by acknowledging the obvious discontinuity in
protections afforded individual participants. 9
Although Varity emphatically establishes the importance of
protecting individual participants' rights, it leaves many wondering what will happen in the wake of subsequent interpretations of
the case. Some feel that the United States Supreme Court has
unnecessarily toyed with a fairly straightforward section of ERISA
and confused the standards that govern employer communications.2 Opponents of Varity observe that such an interpretation
will obligate employers to alter the way in which they transmit
benefit information to employees,2 1 increase administrative costs
to the employer and discourage employers from instituting benefit
and pension plans. 2 They warn that "the courts should give
greater credence to the practical effects of their decisions, past
administrative enforcement, accepted business practices, and the
need to establish a clear framework." 22 3 How practical, however, is
a remedial statute that does not provide adequate safeguards for
the individuals it was enacted to protect?224 This reluctance to
214. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).

215. Id.
216. 905 F.2d 975, 982 (6th Cir. 1990).
217. 919 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
218. 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1068 (1996).
219. Linda Greenhouse, Legacy of a Term - A Special Report; In Supreme
Court's Decisions, a Clear Voice, and a Murmur, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1996, at

Al.
220. Ronald E. Richman & Morton I. Lorge, ERISA: Fear and Loathing, THE
METRO. CORP. COUNS., July 1996, at 12.
221. Id.; See also David B. Brandolph, Impact of Court's Varity Ruling Considered by ERISA Practitioners,23 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 891

(Apr. 1, 1996) (stating that "plan sponsors may find themselves liable for giving wrong answers to participants while attempting to explain complicated
plan provisions ...employers will ultimately fail in their efforts to control

such communications and the result will be more litigation against them.").
222. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989).
223. Brandolph, supra note 223, at 891.
224. Employment; Misrepresentation Claims - State Law Claims - ERISA
Preemption, MASS. LAW. WKLY., May 6, 1996, at 7. One court commented
that it found "added impetus for applying the [Varity] exception because of

the nature of the case ERISA is a remedial statute designed to fashion anodynes that protect the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries...
Courts should not hasten to employ technical rules of pleading and practice to
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burden employers with additional obligations and liabilities con-

tradicts Congress' intention to protect plan participants and beneficiaries from fiduciary malfeasance.225 In the instant case, a gap
in the ERISA scheme leaves individual participants and beneficiaries bereft of relief if their rights are compromised.
While permitting individuals to sue for extracontractual relief
may open the door to more litigation,226 it is hardly a reason to
quell individual rights to extracontractual remedies where they
are called for to make a participant whole. Congress now needs to
amend ERISA to reflect the need for greater protection and to prevent further misinterpretation of § 502(a)(3).

defeat that goal." Id.
225. Zanglein, supra note 204, at 9.
226. Some practitioners believe that by permitting individual participants to
bring actions for equitable relief, the court expanded the scope of claims that
can potentially confront plan fiduciaries. Lindo & Stong, supra note 157, at
1453. As a result these practitioners assume increased fiduciary litigation is
inevitable. Id.

